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MAGISTRATE TRIALS: THE NEW
HIERARCHY OF CLASS 2 ADJUNCTS
AND ARTICLE III JUDGES
The Federal Magistrates Act 1 (the Magistrates Act) confers
upon United States magistrates broad powers to aid in the administration of justice at the trial court level.2 Section 636(c) of the

Magistrates Act allows magistrates to conduct civil trials and to
enter judgments with the consent of the parties.3 The statute requires that a federal district judge specially designate the magistrate to exercise this power, and sets forth procedures to ensure
that no litigant is coerced to consent to a referral.4 A magistrate
enjoys neither the life tenure nor the salary protection afforded
federal judges by article HI of the United States Constitution.5 In28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1982).
See id. § 636. The Magistrates Act, drafted in response to increased dissatisfaction
with the United States commissioner system, was adopted to reduce federal docket congestion and to "reform the first echelon of the Federal judiciary." H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4252, 4253-54. The
Magistrates Act allows magistrates to fulfill a broad range of functions in addition to those
formerly performed by commissioners. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982); Spaniol, The Federal
Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974 ARLz. ST. L.J. 565, 568. These functions
were expanded, enumerated and clarified by amendment in 1976. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729; see Jurisdictionof United States Magistrates:Hearings on S.
1238 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The amendments allow magistrates to hear
and determine all but eight case-dispositive motions, subject to review by a district judge
under a clearly erroneous standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982). Exempted motions may
be referred to a magistrate for fact-finding and disposition subject to a de novo determination by the district judge. Id. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1982).
' 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982). The consensual trial provision states in part(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate...
may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the
entry of judgment in the case, when specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court. . . .
Id. See generally McCabe, The Federal MagistrateAct of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343,
345-62 (1979) (discussion of the development of the magistrate system).
' 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982). The Act offers litigants the option of having an action
referred to a magistrate. Id. Each litigant must communicate his decision to the court clerk;
thereafter neither the magistrate nor the judge may attempt to persuade either party to
consent to a magistrate trial. Id.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1982) (providing for limited terms for magistrates) with
U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1 (authorizing life tenure for federal judges). Article H states in
pertinent part2

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:559

stead, he functions as an "adjunct" to the district court.' In 1982,
the Supreme Court, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.

Marathon Pipe Line Co., 7 held that the non-article Ill adjunct

scheme created by the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (the Bankruptcy Act) 8 unconstitutionally "removed most, if not all, of 'the
essential attributes of the judicial power' from the Art[icle] HI district court, and . . . vested those attributes in a non-Art[icle]

IT

adjunct." The Northern Pipeline decision led a panel of the Court
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Framers considered the tenure and salary provisions of article
III essential to maintaining the structural integrity of the Federal Government. Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982). Not only were these
guarantees viewed as a "safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam),
but also as a means of ensuring impartial adjudication by Federal judges, THE FEDERALmST
No. 78, at 529 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Periodical appointments, however regulated, . . . would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the courts'] necessary independence.")
The "good Behaviour" clause is construed as assuring life tenure to article IT judges,
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955), while the "Compensation"
clause guarantees fixed salaries, United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1980). See
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933) (noting Framers' objection to dependence on King's will for tenure and salary of members of the judiciary). The Framers
deemed these protections necessary to ensure that the judicial power of article I would be
exercised by judges free from majoritarian pressures or fear of reprisal or rebuke. Id. at 530.
Federal magistrates, on the other hand, serve for eight-year terms, 28 U.S.C. § 631(e)
(1982), and may be removed from office for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or
physical or mental disability, id. § 631(h). Article III judges may only be removed by impeachment for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. While magistrates
are statutorily assured an irreducible salary during their term in office, Congress is free to
amend or abolish the statute. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 593 (1962) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
" See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
7

458 U.S. 50 (1982).

8 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Act),
which substantially expanded the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges, created bankruptcy
courts in each district as adjuncts to the district court. Id. § 151(a). These courts were
granted jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under ... or related to cases under
title 11 [the Bankruptcy title]," id. § 1471(b); see id. § 1471(c). Bankruptcy judges were to
be appointed by the President to serve for 14 year terms, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, id. §§ 152, 153(a), and were to be subject to removal by the circuit council for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability," id. § 153(b).
Their salaries were subject to statutory diminution by Congress pursuant to the Federal
Salary Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). Bankruptcy judges could
exercise all ordinary "powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty." Id. § 1481.
1 458 U.S. at 87 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). In NorthernPipeline, appellant, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. (Northern), filed suit against appellee,
Marathon Pipe Line Co. (Marathon), in the bankruptcy court seeking "damages for alleged
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to conclude, in Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc. (PacemakerI),1o that section 636(c) of the Magistrates Act could not withstand constitutional analysis.1" The Ninth Circuit subsequently withdrew its
breaches of contract and warranty, as well as for alleged misrepresentation, coercion and
duress," under the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)-(c)
(1982). 458 U.S. at 56-57. Marathon moved for dismissal on the ground that the bankruptcy
judge, who lacked life tenure and salary protection, could not constitutionally exercise judicial power to decide traditional law and equity claims related only tangentially to a petition
in bankruptcy. Id. The bankruptcy judge denied Marathon's motion to dismiss, but the
motion was granted on appeal by the district court, which held that "the delegation of authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1471" to bankruptcy judges to decide cases not arising under title 11
was unconstitutional. Id. at 57. On appeal to the Supreme Court, a plurality of four justices
affirmed the district court. Id. at 88. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, noted that
"[t]he Court has only recently reaffirmed the significance. . . of the Framers' design" of our
tripartite system of government which demands a judiciary "independent of the Executive
and Legislature-to maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure, and
also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained impartial," id. at 58, and
concluded that the "clear institutional protections" of article MI designed to maintain an
independent judiciary must "be jealously guarded," id. at 60. After noting that bankruptcy
judges do not enjoy life tenure or salary protection, id. at 60-61; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 153-154
(1982), the plurality concluded that bankruptcy judges "do not enjoy the protections constitutionally afforded to Art. III judges," 458 U.S. at 60. The Court then rejected the two
alternative arguments set forth by the appellants: (1) bankruptcy courts were valid as legislative courts established pursuant to Congress' enumerated article I powers, id. at 62; see
infra note 21, and; (2) if the bankruptcy related action brought by Northern required article
III adjudication, this requirement was satisfied by Congress' designation of bankruptcy
courts as "adjuncts" to the district courts, id. at 62-63; see infra note 23. See 458 U.S. at 7071, 87. In sum, the plurality held that the 1978 Bankruptcy Act "suggest[ed] unwarranted
encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which our Constitution
reserves for Art. IH courts," 458 U.S. at 84, concluding that "the broad grant of jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy courts" was unconstitutional, id. at 87.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, stated that
he "would [only] hold so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy
court to entertain and decide Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's objection to be violative of
Art. I," but "agree[d] with the plurality that this grant of authority is not readily severable from the remaining grant of authority to bankruptcy courts under § 1471." Id. at 91-92
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, noting the effect of Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence on the plurality's decision, emphasized that "the Court's holding is limited to
the proposition . . . that a 'traditional' state common-law action, not made subject to a
federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy
under federal law, must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by an 'Article II
court' if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United States." Id. at 92 (Burger, C.
J., dissenting).
10 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en banc, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984).
11712 F.2d at 1313. Judge Boochever, writing for a unanimous panel, found the magistrate system irreconcilable with any constitutionally recognized category of federal judicial
officers. Id. at 1309-10. Initially, the court noted that magistrates lack life tenure and constitutional salary protection and, therefore, could not be classified as article II judges. Id. at
1309. The broad subject-matter jurisdiction exercised by magistrates foreclosed their classification as article I legislative judges. Id. Finally, the court rejected Congress' classification
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opinion and ordered a rehearing en banc for reconsideration of the
constitutional issues.12 One month later, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in Wharton-Thomas v. United States,13 explicitly rejected the reasoning of the Pacemaker I panel and, emphasizing the provision for consent of the litigants, upheld the constitutionality of section 636(c). 14 Subsequent to the Wharton-Thomas
of the magistrate system as creating valid adjuncts to the district courts. Id. at 1309-10.
Turning to the "saving provisions" of the Act, the court considered the statutory provision for litigant consent, id. at 1310-12; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982), internal delegation
of judicial power, 712 F.2d at 1312-13; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982), and the availability
of appellate review by an article III judge, 712 F.2d at 1313; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1982).
The panel found that the right to an article I adjudication was more than a due process
right. 712 F.2d at 1312. Thus, to the extent that this right implicated the framework of
government, it could not simply be waived by consent of the parties. Id. Rejecting the contention that derivation of the magistrate's power from within the judicial branch cured any
separation of powers concerns, Judge Boochever noted that a magistrate's independence
could be as easily curtailed by pressures from within the judiciary as from the coordinate
branches of government. Id. at 1312-13; see Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts:
The Constitutionalityof the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 MagistrateAct, 80 COLUm L.
REv. 560, 591 (1980). Finally, the court concluded that article Ill requirements could not be
satisfied by the possibility of appellate review by an article m tribunal since "'constitutional requirements for the exercise of judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication.'" 712 F.2d at 1313 (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.39).
22 718 F.2d 971, 972 (9th Cir. 1983).
13 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
14 Id. at 929-30. The court declined to follow the PacemakerI panel "because it [read]
too much into Northern Pipeline." Id. at 930. While the Wharton-Thomas court characterized the PacemakerI opinion as "a thorough and thoughtful one," the couit found that the
separation of powers concerns underlying the Northern Pipeline plurality's rationale were
not implicated by the magistrate system since the only potential threats to the magistrates'
independence would come from the judicial branch and not from Congress. Id. at 927. The
Wharton-Thomas court concluded that it is unlikely that a district judge would attempt to
influence a magistrate's decision, but that even if this were to occur, such conduct would
implicate due process rights, not article III concerns. Id. at 927 n.8. The Third Circuit also
rejected the contention of the Pacemaker I panel that since article II is jurisdictional in
nature, and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties, the parties cannot
consent to trial by a non-article I judge in federal court. Id. at 926; see Pacemaker1, 712
F.2d at 1312. Further, the Wharton-Thomas court noted that the Bankruptcy Act struck
down in Northern Pipeline did not provide for litigant consent. 721 F.2d at 925-26. Rather
than adopt the holding of the Northern Pipeline plurality, the court adopted "the holding
agreed on by a majority of the Court." Id. at 926; see Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); supra note 9. The Third Circuit also found "other, albeit older"
Supreme Court precedent to support its view of the impact of consent. 721 F.2d at 928,
(citing Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123,
128 (1864)). The Wharton-Thomas court concluded that the presence of consent, combined
with the statutory provisions for district court power to vacate a reference, 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(6) (1982), judicial appointment and removal of magistrates, id. § 631(a), (i), special
designation of magistrates to try cases, id. § 636(c)(1), and the right to appeal to a district
judge or the court of appeals, id. § 636(c)(3)-(5), ensured the constitutionality of § 636(c).
721 F.2d at 930.
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decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding in Pacemaker I
and upheld section 636(c) in Pacemaker I. 15 One week later, in
Collins v. Foreman,18 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
followed the reasoning of Wharton-Thomas and PacemakerII and
17
affirmed the constitutionality of the statute.
" Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir.
1984) (en banc) (Pacemaker II), rev'g 712 F.2d 1305 (1983). The Pacemaker II majority
viewed the Magistrates Act as invoking two components of the separation of powers: one
involving an individual and a governmental branch, the other component involving relations
among the three branches. 725 F.2d at 546. While acknowledging "the premise that Article
IH adjudication is, in part, a personal right of the litigant," id., the court concluded that the
first component of the separation of powers may be waived by the litigants as long as the
right has been "voluntarily relinquished," id. at 543. Section 636(c), the Ninth Circuit observed, does not invoke the ordinary separation of powers issue, rather, "[t]he potential for
disruption is... the erosion of the central powers of the judiciary by permitting it to delegate its own authority." Id. at 544. The majority concluded that the statute contained sufficient protections to ensure judicial control of potentially excessive delegation, the same four
statutory provisions emphasized by the Wharton-Thomas court. Id. at 545-46; see supra
note 14. Concluding that the statute contained adequate protections to overcome claims of
invalidity, the Pacemaker II majority held that "consensual reference of a civil case to a
magistrate is constitutional." 725 F.2d at 547.
The dissent, authored by Judge Schroeder, found the three major assumptions underlying the majority's reasoning to be fallacious. Id. at 547 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). First, the
dissent rejected the majority's contention that consent is important to a constitutional analysis, arguing that since "the judicial power of the United States is conferred upon Article H
judges by the Constitution," consent was "simply irrelevant to the ... proper allocation of
judicial power under the Constitution." Id. at 550 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Second, while
the majority found that article HI control over magistrates ensured the constitutional application of the system, see id. at 544-45, in reality, such control prevented independent decisionmaking, since article III requires independence from other article In judges, not merely
from the coordinate branches, id. at 552 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Schroeder contended that the voluntariness of litigant consent under the Act was illusory, since
Congress itself admitted that magistrate trials were intended in part to serve as a poor
man's court. Id. at 553-54 (Schroeder, J., dissenting); see S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1469, 1472. The dissent concluded
that such "economic coercion," when combined with the subtle pressuring of litigants by
overworked district judges to take cases to magistrates, rendered the consensual reference
system violative of article H. Id. at 554 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
18 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984).
17 Id. at 117-19. The Second Circuit, in a unanimous panel opinion by Chief Judge
Feinberg, held that "section 636(c) does not violate [the doctrine of] separation of powers."
Id. at 114. The panel noted that while § 636(c) allowed the district judge to delegate more
authority to the magistrate than the Supreme Court approved in United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1980), the statute contained provisions for special trial designation of
magistrates, judicial appointment and removal, and district court power to vacate a reference, and thus had no effect on the "allocation of power between Congress and the district
courts" approved in Raddatz. Collins, 729 F.2d at 115.
The Collins court held that a provision for district court de novo review was unnecessary when the parties consented to the reference. See id. at 116. The panel noted the impact
of consent in three important areas: First, while consent could not confer jurisdiction, it
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This Note will extract from Northern Pipeline the constitutional principles relevant to an analysis of section 636(c) of the
Magistrates Act. After noting the failure of the courts of appeals to
consider a crucial theme underlying the Northern Pipeline decision, a judicial narrowing of the statute will be suggested to align
section 636(c) with the Northern Pipeline Court's perceptions of
article III. Lastly, the Magistrates Act will be assessed within the
structural context of the federal judicial system.
Formulatinga ConstitutionalDoctrine of Class 2 Adjuncts
The threshold question presented by section 636(c) is whether
Congress may constitutionally implement a nationwide system that
permits the district court, with consent of the parties, to delegate
decisionmaking power to a non-article III officer. Although the
Northern Pipeline Court had no occasion to consider the effect of
consent on the limits of permissible delegation of article III judicial power,"8 the Court's analysis of the doctrine of article III
courts provides a framework within which section 636(c) may be
evaluated."9 The Court described two ways in which Congress
could assign adjudicatory functions to a non-article III tribunal
consistently with the "principle that the judicial power of the
United States must be vested in Art[icle] III courts.

' 20

First, the

Court identified three limited situations wherein Congress may
create "legislative courts" pursuant to its article I powers. 2 ' These
could validly act as "a necessary condition for the exercise of jurisdiction," id. at 119; second, consent could "affect the limits of permissible delegation," id.; and third, consent provides a structural limitation on the magistrate system by preventing wholesale delegation of
judicial power to non-article III adjuncts, id. Finally, the Second Circuit concluded that no
due process concerns could arise from a § 636(c) reference as long as the reference was
uncoerced and procedurally safeguarded. Id. at 120.
The courts of appeal for the First and Fifth Circuits have subsequently affirmed the
constitutional analysis of § 636(c) first introduced by the Wharton-Thomas court. See
Puryear v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d
32, 34-35 (1st Cir. 1984).
18 See Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 542. The Collins, Pacemaker II, and WhartonThomas courts all noted dicta in Northern Pipeline indicating the potential importance of
consent to a constitutional analysis. Collins, 729 F.2d at 119; PacemakerII, 725 F.2d at 542;
Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 926.
9 See Collins, 729 F.2d at 112 (PacemakerI, Wharton-Thomas, and Pacemaker II all
relied on Northern Pipeline in evaluation of the constitutionality of § 636(c)).
20 458 U.S. at 77.
21 See id. at 70. The Northern Pipeline plurality recognized that Congress, pursuant to
article I of the United States Constitution, has established courts with judges who are not
protected by the tenure and salary provisions of article I, nor subject to its jurisdictional
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tribunals, the Court maintained, are historically recognized exceptions to the "literal command" of article III.22 Second, the Court
limitations. Id. at 60-62; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. While the language of this clause,
which grants Congress power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, has been construed to refer to only the "inferior courts" mentioned
in article H, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962), Congress has nevertheless
used its inherent power under article I to create courts that exist independently of the article IH judicial system, see Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline: Confusion Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 207, 207 n.1 (1983). The creation of these
courts, which are interchangeably referred to as "article I courts" or "legislative courts," has
been upheld by the Supreme Court for over 150 years as within Congress' article I powers.
See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). In Northern Pipeline, however, Justice Brennan construed these precedents to recognize the validity of only
three types of article I tribunals: territorial courts, courts-martial, and courts established for
the purpose of adjudicating "public rights." See 458 U.S. at 64-67. Creation of these courts
has been upheld because Congress acted pursuant to an unusual grant of power that was
"consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of the separation of
powers." Id. at 64; see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
The doctrine of territorial courts was initially set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). The Chief Justice reasoned that the
source of territorial judicial power did not spring from article I, but rather from article IV,
which allows Congress to make "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory"
of the United States, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; 26 U.S. at 546. See Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 64-65.
In addition, the Northern Pipeline Court recognized that Congress has established article I power to create military courts outside the realm of article m1.458 U.S. at 66; see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 13-14 (granting Congress power to "provide and maintain a Navy" and
"to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces").
Lastly, the Northern Pipeline Court recognized Congress' power to create legislative
courts for the purpose of adjudicating "public rights." 458 U.S. at 67. Public rights are
"matters arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments" Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)), "and only to matters
that historically could have been determined exclusively by those departments." 458 U.S. at
67-68 (citing Ex ParteBakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). It is from this doctrine that
Congress has derived its constitutionally recognized power to create administrative agencies.
See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 (1977).
22 458 U.S. at 64. The plurality contended that article I courts could be reconciled with
article III if viewed within "the historical context in which the Constitution was written."
Id. Thus, the Northern Pipeline Court noted, article I courts have never been permitted to
adjudicate matters which are "inherently judicial"; that is, matters that traditionally have
been resolved by courts at common law or in equity, rather than legislative or executive
bodies. Id. at 68 (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)). The appellants
in Northern Pipeline contended that a fourth category of legislative courts should be created pursuant to Congress' power to establish "'uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,"' id. at 72 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4), but the

plurality observed that a strict historical approach was necessary in permitting the formation of legislative courts, since failure to enforce a "limiting principle" would allow Congress
to create a network of legislative courts that ultimately could replace the article Ill judicial
system. 458 U.S. at 73.
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recognized Congress' power to create "adjuncts" to the district
courts and to delegate to these adjuncts certain judicial functions.23 The formation of adjunct tribunals, unlike article I legislative courts, was not perceived by the Northern Pipeline plurality
as constituting an exception to article 111.24 Instead, delegation to
an adjunct was found to be "consistent with Art[icle] Ill, so long as
'the essential attributes of the judicial power' are retained in the
Art[icle] III court. '2 5 The Court then drew a distinction between
two classes of adjuncts. Congress may empower "class 1 adjuncts" 26 to adjudicate specific federally-created rights, for then it
"possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which
[such] right[s] may be adjudicated. ' 27 Class 2 adjuncts, however,
are created by Congress not for the limited purpose of vindicating
specific congressionally created rights, but rather to assist the dis23 458 U.S. at 77-78. The plurality recognized that article III courts may call on nonarticle I personnel to aid the court in an advisory capacity in fact-finding and other traditionally judicial functions. Id.; see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-52 (1932). A federal
jury is an example of a constitutionally mandated "adjunct" to the article I courts. 285
U.S. at 51. Courts in admiralty and equity have historically called on the assistance of "assessors" to state an account or compute damages. Id. The practice continues today in the
use of masters in the federal courts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53. "In exercising [its] original
jurisdiction under Art. I," the Supreme Court regularly appoints masters "who may be
either Art. I judges or members of the Bar," to find facts and state conclusions of law.
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 n.11 (1980). While every determination of fact
in article I courts need not be made by judges, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932),
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on an adjunct scheme that permits the adjuncts to
render an ultimate decision, see Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-82.
458 U.S. at 77 n.29.
Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
20 While the Northern Pipeline plurality did not use the terms "class 1" or "class 2"
adjuncts, this Note has adopted these terms for the sake of convenience and brevity.
27 458 U.S. at 80. The plurality noted that "use of administrative agencies as adjuncts
was first upheld in Crowell v. Benson," where appellants had challenged the constitutionality of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission's power to enforce federal
statutes that required employers to compensate workers for injuries that occurred on the
navigable waters of the United States. 458 U.S. at 78. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 38
(1932). The agency was empowered to determine the nature and extent of employees' injuries, id. at 54, but could not enforce its compensation orders, see id. at 44-45. Analogizing
the Commission's function to that of an equity assessor, the Crowell Court held that the
adjunct scheme was consistent with article Hi. Id. at 54.
While both class 1 adjuncts and "public rights" legislative courts are empowered to
enforce congressionally created rights, only class 1 adjuncts, such as the Commission in
Crowell, may resolve disputes involving private rights, those involving "the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined." Id. at 51. Since private rights disputes "lie
at the core of the historically recognized judicial power," 458 U.S. at 70, non-article I
tribunals empowered to resolve such disputes must not be independent of the article Mi
system, but instead must be an extension of the article I court itself, see id. at 77 & n.29.
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trict courts in a general manner that permeates all areas of substantive law.28 Thus, class 2 adjuncts may assist in the adjudication
of constitutional rights. 29 Consequently, when Congress creates a
class 2 system, it must comply with the Northern Pipeline caveat
that class 2 adjuncts be "subject to sufficient control by an
Art[icle] III district court." 30
Thus far, the Magistrates Act is the only class 2 system that
has been constitutionally scrutinized by the Supreme Court,3 1 and
Northern Pipeline and United States v. Raddatz3 2 are the only
cases that suggest the permissible extent to which Congress may
delegate inherently judicial functions to a class 2 adjunct. Neither
Northern Pipeline nor Raddatz, however, make clear which or how
many essential attributes of judicial power must be retained by an
article III court to ensure the constitutionality of the class 2 system created by section 636(c). 3 3 First, Raddatz did not address
whether Congress "could constitutionally have delegated the task
of rendering a final decision" to a class 2 adjunct.s4 Second, while
Northern Pipeline set forth a five-prong test for appraising the degree of retention of the essential article III attributes of judicial
power, this test is directed primarily toward class 1 adjuncts.3 5
" See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982); FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
29

458 U.S. at 78-79; see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1980) (uphold-

ing magistrate's power to make findings and recommendations on defendant's motion to
suppress evidence involving fifth amendment claim).
30458 U.S. at 79. While only class 2 adjuncts must be subject to article Il control to
the extent approved in Raddatz, both classes of adjuncts are subject to the restriction that
all or even most of the essential attributes of judicial power may not be withdrawn from the
article 1H court by a statutory scheme. See id. at 81. For a discussion of the factors that
enter into a finding of "sufficient" article I control, see infra text accompanying notes 5559.
21 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. While the Court has long approved
the use of masters as class 2 adjuncts to article HI courts, see, e.g., Kimberly v. Arms, 129
U.S. 512, 524 (1889), there are severe restrictions on when they may be used, see La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957); FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). Masters are therefore
not part of an adjunct "system" in the same sense as are magistrates.
22 447 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1980).
" See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84-86; Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-83.
34 447 U.S. at 681.
25 See 458 U.S. at 84-86. Since the plurality exclusively cited Crowell in its five-prong
enumeration to exemplify the use of class 1 adjuncts, but cited Raddatz to demonstrate the
contrasting features of class 2 adjuncts, it is suggested that the Northern Pipeline fiveprong test is intended to apply specifically to a class 1 scheme. See id. at 85. Since the
primary purpose of the bankruptcy courts was to enforce federal law, the NorthernPipeline
plurality evidently viewed the Bankruptcy Act as designed to implement a class 1 scheme.
See id. at 84 & n.36. In this limited portion of the Act, the plurality acknowledged that
"[t]he interaction between the Legislative and Judicial Branches is at its height, where
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Since the features of a class 2 adjunct system differ from those of a
class 1 system,38 it is suggested that the essential attributes of judicial power that must remain with the article III court will also differ in the context of class 2 adjuncts. Therefore, to evaluate section
636(c), it is necessary to examine the reasoning behind the Northern Pipeline plurality's five-prong class 1 adjunct test and, taking
into consideration the unique features of class 2 adjuncts, fashion a
new test specifically tailored to evaluate the constitutionality of
the system created by the Magistrates Act.
The five essential attributes enumerated by Northern Pipeline
for evaluating a class 1 system are: (1) whether the adjunct's jurisdiction extends beyond actions brought to vindicate congressionally created rights; (2) whether the adjunct exercises all of the
jurisdiction purportedly conferred on the district courts by Congress over a particular area of substantive law; (3) whether the adjunct exercises all ordinary district court powers; (4) whether the
adjunct's decisions are subject only to a clearly erroneous standard
of review on appeal to an article III court; and (5) whether the
adjunct is empowered to enter final and enforceable judgments
37
that are binding in the absence of an appeal.
It is because class 2 adjuncts may adjudicate constitutional
claims that there is a need for statutorily mandated "sufficient"
control by an article III court.38 The constitutional theory behind
this "sufficiency" concept is that the class 2 adjunct partakes of
courts are adjudicating rights wholly of Congress' creation." Id. at 83 n.35. However, that
portion of the Act that permitted appellant Northern to bring contract and misrepresentation claims against Marathon in a bankruptcy court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982), involved state created rights, where Congress' authority to prescribe the manner of adjudication "plainly must be deemed at a minimum," since "Congress has not purported to
prescribe a rule of decision for the resolution of [state-law] claims." 458 U.S. at 84 & n.36.
Thus, even if the plurality had analyzed the Bankruptcy Act as establishing a class 2
scheme, the Court would have reached the same result, since bankruptcy judges were clearly
not subject to "sufficient" article III control. See id. at 80 n.31, 86.
36 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. The greatest difference between class
1 and class 2 adjuncts for purposes of constitutional analysis is the degree of scrutiny applied in the evaluation of each. See 458 U.S. at 82-83. While class 1 adjunct systems are
evaluated according to a rational basis test, class 2 schemes are subject to strict scrutiny.
See id. ("the Court's scrutiny of the adjunct scheme in Raddatz-which played a role in the
adjudication of constitutional rights-was far stricter than it had been in Crowell").
37 458 U.S. at 85-86. The plurality found that all five of these essential attributes expressed in Northern Pipeline were absent from the Bankruptcy Act. Id. The Court concluded that the "adjunct" label affixed by Congress was a mere facade, behind which bankruptcy judges exercised de facto article III powers. See id. at 86.
11 Id. at 78-79; see Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the article III impartiality of the federal judiciary through an "umbilical" relationship with the district court and, thereby, is insulated by the article III judges from improper influences from the
coordinate branches.3 9 The presence of sufficient article III control
would allay Hamiltonian fears of both "improper [judicial] complaisance" to the executive or legislative branches, and the natural
tendency to follow popular opinion rather than the Constitution
and the laws. 0 Such dangers are less apparent in the class 1 arena,
since the class 1 adjunct has been created specifically to carry out
the will of Congress.4 1
In addition, the need for control by an article III court derives
from the differing jurisdictional theories underlying the creation of
class 1 and class 2 adjuncts. While class 1 adjuncts receive specific
grants of subject-matter jurisdiction from Congress for the purpose
of enforcing specific statutes, the class 2 adjunct's subject-matter
jurisdiction flows from the umbilical relationship with the district
court. 42 A class 2 adjunct, therefore, may hear any case for which
there is federal jurisdiction pursuant to other provisions of the
United States Code. 3 Consequently, the jurisdictional problem
raised by the class 2 system properly can be termed one of "forum
jurisdiction," since the controversy does not involve what cases
may be heard in federal tribunals, but rather by whom they may
be heard."
These dissimilarities between class 1 and class 2 adjuncts give
rise to systemic distinctions that affect the application of the fiveprong NorthernPipeline test to a class 2 system.4 The first prong,
which in effect bars the conferral of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction upon a class 1 adjunct, 46 would have no effect on a class 2
-9 See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated
that "the only conceivable danger of a 'threat' to the 'independence' of the magistrate comes
from within, rather than from without, the judicial department." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
40 See Tan FEDERALisT No. 78, at 529 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
41 See 458 U.S. at 83 n.35; supra note 27 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1979) ("jurisdiction remains
vested in the district court and is merely exercised through the medium of the magistrate").
43See PacemakerII, 725 F.2d at 543; Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 926.
41 See Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 926.
4 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85-86; infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
4' See 458 U.S. at 85. The plurality distinguished the adjunct scheme upheld in Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), in which the agency was confined to making particular types
of factual determinations in a narrow area of substantive law, from the jurisdictional grant
to the bankruptcy courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982), that permits a non-article I tribu-
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adjunct, who is by definition potentially empowered to hear any
case over which the district courts may validly exercise jurisdiction.47 The second prong, which essentially prohibits Congress
from granting exclusive jurisdiction to a class 1 adjunct, is similarly inapposite when applied to a class 2 adjunct, because a class 2
adjunct's forum jurisdiction is wholly dependent upon the will of
the district judge.4 8 Moreover, conditions precedent to the adjunct's exercise of decisionmaking power, such as litigant consent
and district court designation, would appear to provide the same
limiting force upon the adjunct's forum jurisdiction in the class 2
arena that limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction provide in the
class 1 arena.4 9
The fourth and fifth prongs of the Northern Pipeline Court's
class 1 adjunct test, which address standard of review5 0 and power
to issue a final judgment, 51 appear to remain essential elements of
judicial power when transposed into the class 2 arena. 52 It is submitted, however, that the third prong, which addresses a class 1
adjunct's exercise of ordinary district court powers, is subsumed
under the fifth prong when applied to class 2 adjuncts, since the
special designation to exercise
district judge is free to withhold
53
such powers in a class 2 setting.
nal to decide pendent state claims raised by the petitioner in a reorganization proceeding as
well as ancillary claims raised by the defendants to such actions. See 458 U.S. at 85; 28
U.S.C. § 1471(b); supra note 8.
"7 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
4' See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
40 See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) ("the consent provision of
section 636(c) provides a constraint against the wholesale delegation of judicial power to
adjuncts of the district court"). It is submitted that a prerequisite of litigant consent within
a class 2 statutory scheme can be considered the equivalent of a provision in a class 1
scheme withholding exclusive jurisdiction, as well as ancillary and pendent jurisdiction,
from the class 1 adjunct.
50 See 458 U.S. at 85. While agency orders in Crowell v. Benson were to be set aside if
"not supported by the evidence," decisions by bankruptcy judges were subject to only a
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. Id.; see RULES BANaL P. 810.
51See 458 U.S. at 85-86. The plurality noted that the agency in Crowell v. Benson was
"required by law to seek enforcement of its compensation orders in the district court." Id. at
85.
52 See, e.g., Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-82 (standard of review and decisionmaking power
elements of statutory scheme essential to upholding constitutionality of class 2 adjunct system embodied in § 636(b)); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976) (same).
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982); supra note 3. In a class 1 scheme, Congress directly
mandates that the adjunct be empowered to exercise traditional district court functions. See
28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982). If the class 1 adjunct is also empowered to exercise ancillary and
exclusive jurisdiction, Congress' additional failure to satisfy the third prong would "suggest
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Finally, the Northern Pipeline holding demands an added
consideration when evaluating the constitutionality of class 2 adjuncts: The adjunct must be subject to "sufficient" article III control.5 4 Statutory provisions that promote an umbilical relationship

between the class 2 adjunct and the district court-special district
court designation of an adjunct to perform traditional decisionmaking functions 5 5 judicial appointment and removal,5 6 article III
merit selection panels, 57 and district court power to vacate a reference 5 -reflect the degree of article Ill control under the Magistrates Act.
This Note proposes that consideration of the following four
factors will aid in determining whether the essential attributes of
judicial power are retained by a district court implementing a class
2 scheme: (1) whether the adjunct is empowered to issue an ultimate judgment; (2) whether the judgment may be issued only upon
consent of the parties; (3) what standard of review governs appeals
to an article III court; and (4) whether the adjunct possesses an
umbilical relationship to the district court by which he is subject
to "sufficient" article III control.
In order properly to apply these four factors to an evaluation
of a class 2 scheme, it is important to consider that the Northern
Pipeline plurality never contended that the system necessarily
must be struck down if an adjunct exercises any one of the essential attributes.5 9 Instead, Northern Pipeline held that Congress, by
[an] unwarranted [encroachment] upon the judicial power of the United States." Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84. However, when "third-prong" powers are conferred upon a class 2
adjunct, Congress is permitting such powers to be granted to a non-article HI officer. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982). The danger of unwarranted congressional encroachment is reduced through the intervening presence of the district judge. See Collins v. Foreman, 729
F.2d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 1984) (special designation procedures in § 636(c) contribute to preserving constitutional balance of power between Congress and district courts).
' See 458 U.S. at 78-79; supra notes 30, 38-40 and accompanying text.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
' See id. § 631.
See Hearings on S.237 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Seas., App. B (1979). Under the
new selection criteria, "[a] district court may include additional qualification standards appropriate for a particular magistrate's position." Id., Standards for Selection of Magistrates,

§ (E) 11.
I'See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6) (1982) (district court may "for good cause" or "under extraordinary circumstances" by motion of a party, vacate a reference to a magistrate).
' See 458 U.S. at 84-85 (Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional because it "vests all 'essential attributes' of the judicial power of the United States in the 'adjunct' bankruptcy court")
(emphasis added); id. at 77 n.29 (Congress may assign some adjudicatory functions to an
adjunct).
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removing five essential ingredients of judicial power from the district courts, and placing all five into the hands of a single nonarticle III adjunct, had created a scheme that violated article lI.60
Notwithstanding that the Court has consistently held that retention of ultimate decisionmaking power by an article III court is the
single most essential attribute of judicial power in a class 2 context,61 it is suggested that the Northern Pipeline court intentionally did not resolve whether that power may be delegated if the
other essential attributes are retained by an article III court.
Therefore, a class 2 scheme need not be struck down mechanically
because the adjunct may render ultimate decisions.6 2 Rather, the
class 2 adjunct test proposed by this Note should be applied in a
contingent fashion. Thus, if the adjunct does not render the ultimate decision, consideration of litigant consent and standard of review should be obviated.68 However, if the class 2 scheme does empower the adjunct to enter the ultimate judgment, it is submitted
that there must be litigant consent, the judgment must not be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard, and the adjunct must
be subject to sufficient article Ill control."
Upholding the Constitutionalityof the Magistrates Act
The reasoning employed by the three circuit courts in upholding the constitutionality of section 636(c) has failed to confront the

"oSee id. at 84-85.
61 See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683 (delegation under § 636(b) "does not violate Art. H so
long as the ultimate decision is made by the district court"); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 271 (1976) (magistrate may preliminarily review a district court's entire social security
docket since the final decision remains with the judge).
62 See

Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1984).
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982); FED. R. Cv. P. 53(b). Pursuant to §
636(b)(1)(A), a judge may refer any non-dispositive pretrial motion to a magistrate for final
determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982). Such findings are subject to review only
"where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to
law." Id. Since the magistrate is not rendering the ultimate decision in the case, consent of
the parties is not required, and a clearly erroneous standard of review is sufficient. See
supra note 2. Similarly, under FAm. R. Civ. P. 53(b), a judge may refer any fact-finding or
non-dispositive pretrial matter to a special master without consent of the parties. Id.; see
supra notes 23, 31. The findings of the master are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of
review in the district court. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2). Therefore, it would appear that unless
an adjunct renders an ultimate decision, the requirements of litigant consent and de novo
review are largely irrelevant to a constitutional analysis. See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d
108, 116 (2d Cir. 1984).
63

4 See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
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adjunct requirements set forth in Northern Pipeline.5 In concluding that "NorthernPipeline's ban against non-Article III tribunals
. .does not apply [to the Magistrates Act]," 66 all three circuits
pointed to the same four features of the statute: (1) consensual reference; (2) district court appointment and special trial designation
of magistrates; (3) district court power to vacate a reference; and
(4) the right to appeal to an article EI court.6 7 It is submitted,
however, that the presence of these four elements, standing alone,
does not ensure that the essential attributes of judicial power will
remain vested in the district courts. The prerequisite of litigant
consent under section 636(c) clearly satisfies the second prong of
the class 2 adjunct test proposed by this Note.68 However, the provisions for judicial appointment and district court trial designation
of magistrates, as well as the provision that enables a district judge
to vacate a reference to a magistrate, are all merely sub-elements
of the requirement of sufficient article II control.6 9 Finally, although the Northern Pipeline court clearly indicated that the
availability of ordinary appellate review is insufficient to "satisfy
either the command or the purpose of Art[icle] rH,70 the Wharton-Thomas, Pacemaker II, and Collins courts apparently agree
that such review is sufficient to dispel Northern Pipeline's article
71
III restrictions.
Since ordinary appellate review involves the application of the
*

:3 See supra text accompanying note 37.
6 Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 930 (3d Cir. 1983).
67 See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 1984); PacemakerII, 725 F.2d at
544-46; Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 930 (3d Cir. 1983).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982); supra note 49 and accompanying text.
e6 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 636(c)(1), (c)(6) (1982); supra notes 55-59 and accompanying
text. In determining the degree of article III control preserved by the Bankruptcy Act, the
Northern Pipeline plurality noted the absence of provisions for judicial appointment and
removal, and district court power to vacate a reference. 458 U.S. at 79 n.31; see United

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The provision in §
636(c)(1) for special trial designation of magistrates, while not addressed by the Northern
Pipeline Court, would undoubtedly be categorized with these other provisions ensuring arti-

cle El control over class 2 adjuncts. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
70 458 U.S. at 74 n.28. The Northern Pipelineplurality rejected Justice White's contention that the right of appeal to an article I court validates the Bankruptcy Act. Id. The
plurality also rejected appellant Northern's contention that "Crowell and Raddatz stand for
the proposition that Art[icle] M is satisfied so long as some degree of appellate review is
provided," maintaining instead that "[o]ur precedents make it clear that the constitutional
requirements for the exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication." Id. at 86 n.39; see also Pacemaker I, 712 F.2d at 1313.
71See Collins, 729 F.2d at 117; PacemakerII, 725 F.2d at 545; Wharton-Thomas, 721
F.2d at 930 (footnote omitted).
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clearly erroneous standard, 72 this assertion by the circuit courts appears to contravene the standard of review consideration of the
class 2 adjunct test.7 ' In point of fact, section 636(c) does not spec-

ify the standard of review to be applied by the reviewing court.7 4 It
simply provides that the court may affirm, reverse, or modify all or
part of the magistrate's ruling.76 Though application of the clearly
erroneous standard can be justified by the statute, which is
couched in language that arguably implies a deferential standard
of review, this standard is mandated neither by the statute itself
nor by its legislative history.76 Admittedly, the perimeters of the
FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).
See supra notes 51, 53 and accompanying text; cf. 1616 Reminc Ltd. Partnership v.
Atchison & Keller Co., 704 F.2d 1313, 1318 (4th Cir. 1983) (Bankruptcy Rule 810 unconstitutional because it prescribes a clearly erroneous standard of review barred by Northern
Pipeline). All three circuits, more or less explicitly, have construed § 636(c) as mandating a
clearly erroneous standard of review. See Collins, 729 F.2d at 117 (§ 636(c)(3)-(4) indicate a
specific authorization from Congress to use clearly erroneous standards); Wharton-Thomas,
721 F.2d at 930 ("The scope of review is whether the factual findings are clearly erroneous"); cf. Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 546 (discussing advantages of review provision of §
636(c) in comparison with de novo review provision of § 636(b)(1)(B)).
Since magistrates are empowered to issue final judgments, the class 2 adjunct test requires that all three remaining prongs be satisfied in order to ensure the constitutionality of
§ 636(c). However, the four-factor enumeration promulgated by the circuit courts satisfies
only two of these prongs. Therefore, as construed by these circuits, § 636(c) does not ensure
the retention of the essential attributes of judicial power within the article M courts. See
supra text accompanying note 65.
7'See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3)-(5) (1982). Section 636(c)(3) provides in part:
(3) Upon entry of judgment. . . an aggrieved party may appeal directly to the
appropriate United States court of appeals from the judgment of the magistrate in
the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court. In this
circumstance, the consent of the parties allows a magistrate. . . to direct the entry of judgment of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Id.; see also id. § 636(c)(4) ("parties may further consent to appeal [to district judge] in the
same manner as on an appeal from a judgment of the district court to a court of appeals").
7 See id. § 636(c)(4).
16 See id.; S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 1469, 1473-74; H.R. RP. No. 287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1979). The ambiguous
reference of § 636(c)(4) to "the same manner as an appeal" from a district court to a court
of appeals does not necessarily include the same standard of review specified in Rule 52(a).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Since the congressional reports are silent on standard of review,
the statutory reference could merely encompass standard filing procedures. This ambiguity
was observed by the Advisory Committee in its note to the recent amendments to Rule 74 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which implements the review provisions of § 636(c)(4).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 74 Advisory Committee note. The Advisory Committee noted that
"[p]resumably Congress intended that the district court follow the same general procedures,
including the 'clearly erroneous'factual review standardof Civil Rule 52(a), that a court of
appeals follows in reviewing a judgment of the district court." Id. (emphasis added). It is
suggested that the Committee's use of the word "presumably" not only acknowledges the
712See
71

1984]

MAGISTRATES ACT

standard of review doctrine in the arena of class 2 adjuncts have
been as yet only roughly drawn by the Supreme Court." Since
both section 1471 of the Bankruptcy Act and section 636(b)(1)(B)
of the Magistrates Act are non-consensual, neither Northern Pipeline nor Raddatz shed light on the effect of consent on the permissible standard of review. 78 Therefore, the lower federal courts theoretically are free to determine that the provision for consent under
section 636(c) permits the application of a clearly erroneous standard.79 It is submitted, however, that while litigant consent may
eliminate the need for de novo review, both substantive and structural constitutional concerns militate against article HI courts applying merely a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing the decision of a non-article III adjunct.
The Supreme Court has indicated that, with respect to subabsence of legislative history on the subject, but also suggests a hesitance to infer such a
standard absent a clear directive from Congress. Nevertheless, the Collins court believed
that the language of § 636(c)(4) and (5) indicated that "Congress has specifically authorized" a clearly erroneous standard of review. Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 118 (2d Cir.
1984).
7 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
78 Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 928 (3d Cir. 1983); see Pacemaker
II, 725 F.2d at 540; cf. Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 1984) (all appellee
need show "is that the delegation is constitutional when the parties consent to the reference"). Raddatz dealt with the constitutionality of § 636(b)(1)(B), which authorizes a district court to refer to a magistrate a motion for an evidentiary hearing in a criminal case.
See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 669; 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1) (1982). Under such a referral, the district judge decides the motion based on the record developed before the magistrate, including the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
The district judge must make a "de novo determination" of those portions of the record to
which either party objects and may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part," the
magistrate's findings. Id. The Raddatz Court held that the district judge is not required to
engage in a de nova hearing; rather, he must only make an independent determination on
the basis of the written record. 447 U.S. at 674-75. While Raddatz held that article III
demands were satisfied by the provision, id. at 680, it did not address the delegation question posed by § 636(c). See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacemaker
II, 725 F.2d at 546; see also Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 928 (Raddatz not determinative
when there is a consensual reference).
"9Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 72 Advisory Committee note. The committee stated that when,
under § 636(b)(1)(B), a magistrate submits findings and recommendations on a dispositive
pretrial motion or prisoner petition, and "no timely objection is filed, the court need only
satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation." Id. (citation omitted). The fact that post-trial consent of the parties can
transform what would ordinarily be a de novo standard of review into a clearly erroneous
standard lends some support to the contention of the Collins court that the presence of
pretrial consent to delegation will permit the application of the clearly erroneous standard.
See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) ("a different standard of review
when the reference is consensual") (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e)). But see
infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:559

stantive constitutional rights, non-article III fact-finding should be
subject to a more stringent standard of review than a record
formed by an article III district judge.80 Indeed, adequate protection of constitutional rights often hinges on findings of fact shaped
at the trial level.8 " The issue of who may exercise the judicial
power of the United States must therefore extend equally to questions of fact and law, since an appellate court may consider only
those questions of law that flow from the factual record formed by
the trial court.8 2 The trial judge in effect "controls" the appellate
court in the latter's review of the trial court's conclusions of law
when its findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 3 Thus, in approving review of a magistrate's decisions under
a clearly erroneous standard, it is suggested that the WhartonThomas, Pacemaker II, and Collins courts effectively are permitting non-article III magistrates to control review of constitutional
questions of law in an article III court. This result undermines the
fourth prong of the class 2 adjunct test mandating sufficient article
III control, 4 and violates the notion that rights created by the
Constitution are to be secured by judges protected by the tenure
and salary provisions of article

111.85

While a clearly erroneous standard of review may be tenable
in isolated instances, including certain cases where constitutional
rights are implicated, the validity of an adjunct scheme rests upon
broader considerations than a single delegation of decisionmaking
power by an article III judge to an adjunct.88 When the Northern
80

See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64 (1932) (distinguishing between appropriate

standards of review in cases of congressionally created and constitutional rights); see also
Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978).
0' See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932); cf. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86
n.39 (Framers intended article III judicial independence to be applied to less "glamorous"
common law and statutory matters as well as constitutional rights).
82 See 458 U.S. at 86 n.39; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 707 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932).
83 Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932) (de novo review may not be "simply the
question of due process in relation to notice and hearing," but "rather a question of the
appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial power"); id. at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of [article IH] judicial process").
See supra notes 38-41, 55-59 and accompanying text.
85 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81-83.
8 See Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal
Magistrates:A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024 (1979). It has been suggested that
consensual reference and internal delegation of judicial power pose grave long-term dangers
to the structure of the district courts and the policies underlying article I. Id.
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Pipeline Court struck down the Bankruptcy Act because it "carrie[d] the possibility of ... an unwarranted encroachment" upon
the judicial power, it was evaluating the statute in light of potential future abuses that would eventually undermine the article-IIImandated structure of the federal judiciary.8 While there are dicta
in both Pacemaker1188 and Wharton-Thomas9 that recognize the
scope of the structural article HI concerns raised in Northern
Pipeline,the Ninth Circuit dismissed these concerns, holding that
"[a]t this stage in the evolution of the magistrate system ... [we
think] there are adequate protections in the statute so that it is
not invalid on its face or as applied in the present structure of the
judicial system." 90 Such a statement, it is submitted, misconceives
the long-range structural approach adopted by the Northern Pipeline plurality.
Determining the proper standard of review in the context of
class 2 adjuncts thus implicates both immediate substantive concerns as well as long-term structural considerations."1 While this
87 See 458 U.S. at 84.

I' See Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 544, 546; infra notes 91, 105, 106 and accompanying
text.
so 721 F.2d at 930. The Wharton-Thomas court conceded the systemic threats posed by
§ 636(c):
We do not deny that there may be basis for concern about the wisdom of
large scale delegation of adjudication to magistrates. Wholesale reference of cases
even by consent does pose dangers to the district courts as now organized. As the
practice continues and becomes more widespread, it will tend to become routine. . . The possibility of large scale dilutions of district courts to the point
where magistrates would outnumber district judges is not inconceivable.
Id. Despite this recognition, the Third Circuit reviewed the magistrates' fact-finding under a
clearly erroneous standard. See id.
so Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 546. The Collins court upheld the delegation system of §
636(c) by relying primarily on an analogy to masters. Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 118
(2d Cir. 1984). While conceding this analogy is imperfect, the court concluded that such
imperfections were cured by the provision of § 636(c) for litigant consent. Id. at 119. However, the court failed to resolve the further distinction between masters and magistrates,
namely, that the former are not intended to "reform the first echelon of the federal judiciary." See supra note 2. The Collins court's assertion that Congress viewed overcrowded
federal dockets as fulfilling the "exceptional circumstances" requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53(b), Collins, 729 F.2d at 118, still fails to address the larger structural
implications of the nationwide scope of § 636(c), see PacemakerII, 725 F.2d at 548 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). In his dissent from the PacemakerII decision, Judge Schroeder noted
that "[tihe Act creates mutations in our system of government that transcend its effects on
individual litigants." Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
91 See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text; infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. The Pacemaker II court observed that the doctrine of separation of powers may
have both an individual component as well as a structural component. Pacemaker II, 725
F.2d at 541; see supra note 15. Thus, if under the first component a party may, by consent,
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Note does not advocate striking down the magistrate trial system,
it is suggested that a judicial narrowing of section 636(c) to adopt a
less deferential standard of review will help ensure the constitutional application of the statute. While courts construing section
636(c) have not considered the question, recent bankruptcy cases
applying the Emergency Rule92 may provide some guidance in dewaive his right to have the fact-finding process at a federal trial controlled by an article III
judge, a fortiori, he may also consent to have his case reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Cf. PacemakerII, 725 F.2d at 541 (to the extent that the doctrine of separation of
powers in article III is personal to the parties, it may be waived). However, it is submitted
that the court failed to consider the effect of the second component upon consent to a
clearly erroneous standard. When an adjunct is empowered to render a binding and enforceable final judgment, the purpose of the appeal is to ensure the preservation of article Im
control. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932). To permit a clearly erroneous
standard in such an instance, it is submitted, would tip the balance of control existing between the adjunct and the district court clearly in favor of the adjunct, thereby severing the
umbilical relationship between the two, and would, in turn, permit the incursion of pressures and influences from the coordinate branches. See Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 549
(Schroeder, J., dissenting).
92 See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] BANa. L. REP. (CCH) 68, 908 (effective December 25, 1982). The Northern Pipeline Court, recognizing that its decision would work substantial hardship on relying litigants, held that the decision would apply prospectively and
stayed the effect of its judgment until October 4, 1982, in order to "afford Congress an
opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws." 458 U.S. at
88. When Congress failed to enact remedial legislation during the allotted time period, the
Court once again stayed its judgment until December 24, 1982. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., U.S. -,
103 S. Ct. 199 (1982). Meanwhile, anticipating that Congress might fail to act during the stay period, the Judicial Conference distributed a proposed rule to all bankruptcy, district and appeals court judges. Judicial
Conference Resolution (Sept. 23, 1982); see White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d
254, 256 (6th Cir. 1983). With only minor modification, each circuit council ordered the
district courts within its circuit to adopt the rule. Id. When the Supreme Court refused to
grant another stay, the proposed rule, known as the Bankruptcy Emergency Model Local
Rule (Emergency Rule), went into effect in each of the 11 judicial circuits. Administrative
Order No. 28 (effective December 25, 1982). Under the Emergency Rule, the bankruptcy
judge may enter judgments in "core proceedings," that is, in those cases arising under or in
Title 11. Emergency Rule § (c)(1). In "related" proceedings, that is, civil proceedings arising
independently of the related claim in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge is permitted only to
submit findings and conclusions to the district judge. Id. Significantly, however, the Emergency Rule permits the parties to consent to the entry of judgment in related proceedings
by the bankruptcy judge. Id. § (d)(3)(B).
The Emergency Rule has been widely attacked as unconstitutional by a host of courts
and commentators. See, e.g., In re South Portland Shipyard & Marine Rys., 10 BANKR. CT.
DEC. 1012, 1016-17 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Seven Springs Apartments, 10 BANKa. CT.
DEC. 634, 655-64 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 BANKR. L.J. 1, 9-12 (1983); Norton & Lieb, The Aftermath of Northern Pipeline:
Bankruptcy Jurisdictionunder Local Court Rule, reprinted in NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW
AN PRACTICE (Supp. 1983). But see White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 26364 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding validity of Emergency Rule); Moody v. Martin, 27 Bankr. Rep.
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termining a constitutionally appropriate standard of review to be
applied in appeals from magistrates' decisions.13 For example, in
In re AOV Industries,Inc.,9 4 the District Court for the District of
Columbia reviewed the decision of a bankruptcy judge under a
provision of the Emergency Rule analogous to section 636(c) 95 and
991, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (Rule conforms to standards enumerated in Northern Pipeline).
The Supreme Court has not passed on the validity of the Emergency Rule. See, e.g., American Airlines Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2122 (1983); In re Int'l Harvester Co., No. 82-1385, slip op. (N.D. Ill), mand. denied,
103 S.Ct. 1804 (1983).
03 See, e.g., In re Comer, 716 F.2d 168, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1983) (adopting clearly erroneous standard); Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 386-87 (D.C. Cir.) (applying substantial
evidence test), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3088 (1983); Moody v. Martin, 27 Bankr. Rep. 991,
1000 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (requiring de novo review). The precedential value of bankruptcy
cases considering the appropriate standard of review is limited by the rapid changes occurring in the field of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, particularly following the August 1, 1983
promulgation of the new Bankruptcy Rules. Bankruptcy Rule 8013 states that "[flindings of
fact [of the bankruptcy court] shall not be set aside [on appeal] unless clearly erroneous."
Bankruptcy Rule 8013. While the Emergency Rule appears to create a de novo review standard, § (g) of the Emergency Rule states that "[c]ourts of bankruptcy and procedure in
bankruptcy shall continue to be governed by... the bankruptcy rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court of the United States." Emergency Rule § (g). Bankruptcy Rule 8013 was
promulgated by the Supreme Court; therefore, the Emergency Rule appears to prescribe two
different review standards.
Considering the conflict between what appears to be a de novo standard of review under
the Emergency Rule and the clearly erroneous standard prescribed by Rule 8013, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded in Morissey v. Arnold, 717 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.
1983), that the conflict must be resolved in favor of the clearly erroneous standard, since
Rule 8013 was promulgated pursuant to statutory authority, see 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982),
and the Emergency Rule states that it is to be construed as subordinate to any rules that
may be so promulgated, Emergency Rule § (g). Morissey, 717 F.2d at 104. The Morissey
court further reasoned that while the new rules allow district courts to promulgate rules
such as the Emergency Rule, "such local rules are clearly subordinate to, and may not be
inconsistent with, the national rules." Id. For decisions in accord with the Morissey court's
resolution of the conflict between the Emergency Rule and the new Bankruptcy Rules, see
In re Comer, 716 F.2d at 175; In re Brown, 32 Bankr. Rep. 590, 592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
It is submitted that the cases supporting a clearly erroneous standard of review from
the findings and recommendations or judgments of non-article III officers are not as helpful
to a constitutional analysis as they might be, because the decisions rest on the statutory
supremacy of the Supreme Court-promulgated rules, rather than on an objective assessment
of the constitutional issues involved. But cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326
U.S. 438, 444 (1946) (considering challenge to validity of Supreme Court-promulgated Rule
4() of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 1616 Reminc Ltd. Partnership v. Atchison &
Keller Co., 704 F.2d 1313, 1318 (4th Cir. 1983) (striking down Supreme Court-promulgated
Bankruptcy Rule 810 because it prescribes a clearly erroneous standard of review and thus
"unconstitutionally vest[s] the non-article I bankruptcy referee with too great a measure
of the judicial power of the United States").
" 31 Bankr. Rep. 1005 (D.D.C. 1983).
95 Id. at 1008; see Emergency Rule § (e)(2)(B). Subsection (e)(2)(B) provides:
In conducting review, the district judge may hold a hearing and may receive
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recognized that an appellate court has discretion to apply the standard of review it considers appropriate.9 6 Rejecting the adoption of
the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard, the court held that
the "substantial evidence" standard-relatively strict-was appropriate.9 7 The court noted that while Northern Pipeline forbade a
clearly erroneous standard, it would be inappropriate to imply de
novo review absent a clear congressional directive."" It is submitted
that use of the substantial evidence test would be equally efficasuch evidence as appropriate and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the order or judgment of the bankruptcy judge, and need give no deference
to the findings of the bankruptcy judge. At the conclusion of the review, the district judge shall enter an appropriate order or judgment.
Id. While the Emergency Rule on its face also appears to be similar to § 636(b)(1)(B) of the
Magistrates Act due to the provision for de novo review, § 636(b)(1)(B) states that the reviewing court "shall make a de novo determination" of contested portions of the record. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). The Emergency Rule, by contrast, permits a
de novo hearing, leaving the decision concerning the standard of review to be decided entirely within the discretion of the reviewing judge. Emergency Rule § (e)(2)(B). While it is
true that under both the Emergency Rule and § 636(b)(1) the "district judge is not bound to
give any particular weight" to the findings of the adjunct, In re Rivers, 19 Bankr. Rep. 438,
454 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1983), it is suggested that under
the Emergency Rule, a district court could promulgate a local rule requiring use of the
"clearly erroneous" standard. Such a local rule would not be inconsistent with the Emergency Rule, since the latter is couched in discretionary language, whereas, in the context of
the Magistrates Act, a similar local rule would conflict with the language of § 636(b)(1)
mandating a de novo determination. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
Section 636(c) does not prohibit a reviewing judge from engaging in a de novo determination of the magistrate's judgment; it simply does not address the standard of review to be
applied. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (1982). Section 636(c) and the Emergency Rule, therefore,
are similar in that neither requires nor prohibits any particular standard of review, and
therefore each may be used as a "testing ground" for determining a constitutionally appropriate standard of review in the adjunct arena. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 74 advisory committee
note.
"In re AOV Indus., 31 Bankr. Rep. 1005, 1008 (D.D.C. 1983). The district court noted
that the reviewing court could "accord great deference to the findings and conclusions of the
Bankruptcy Judge" or "conduct a full de novo hearing replete with witnesses and documentary evidence." Id.
97 Id. The AOV court noted that the substantial evidence standard of review was adequate, regardless of whether the proceedings before the bankruptcy judge were "core" or
"related" proceedings, as defined by the Emergency Rule. Id. at 1008 n.4; see supra note 93.
In applying the substantial evidence test, the district court followed the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3088 (1983). AOV Indus., 31 Bankr. Rep. at 1008. Although
the district court distinguished AOV from Kalaris on the ground that Kalaris involved article III review of the findings of an administrative agency, the AOV court found analogous
reasons for using the substantial evidence test in a bankruptcy context. Id.
11 AOV Indus., 31 Bankr. Rep. at 1008; see Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383
U.S. 607, 619 n.17 (1966) (de novo review not normally presumed absent statutory
directive).
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cious in the context of section 636(c). Since the third prong of the
class 2 adjunct test proposed by this Note and the fourth prong of
the class 1 adjunct test under NorthernPipeline both bar the application of a clearly erroneous standard, a substantial evidence
standard would satisfy both tests. 99 Moreover, given the prerequisite of litigant consent under section 636(c), it is likely that a review standard less stringent than the de novo determination requirement upheld in Raddatz would be acceptable. 100
Thus, application of the substantial evidence test contravenes
neither the will of Congress nor the constitutional guidelines set
forth by the Supreme Court.10 1 Moreover, as the majority in Pacemaker II recognized, the real danger behind the Magistrates Act is
not the encroachment of Congress on the judiciary, but rather the
gradual dismantling of the article III system by its officers' overuse
of the consensual reference system.' 0 A substantial evidence standard of review would counterbalance such overuse by incorporating
into the system a protection that operates on a case-by-case basis,
thereby ensuring a constitutional application of section 636(c) regardless of the number of cases delegated to magistrates in the
future.1 03
9 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85. The plurality approved the standard of review to the recommendations of the Commission in Crowell v. Benson in the context of class
1 adjuncts. Id. Agency orders in Crowell "were to be set aside if 'not supported by the
evidence."' Id. Though this standard of review would appear to be a middle ground between "clearly erroneous" and "substantial evidence," the more stringent "substantial evidence" test, it is suggested, is appropriate in the class 2 arena, given the class 2 adjunct's
broader powers and ability to assist in the adjudication of constitutional rights. See supra
notes 29-30 and accompanying text. Significantly, Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Northern Pipeline,approved of the standard of review applied in Crowell, but found that application of the clearly erroneous standard in a bankruptcy context was a crucial factor in destroying the adjunct status of the bankruptcy judges created by the Bankruptcy Act. 458
U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Therefore, a majority of the Justices agreed that a
standard of review akin to a substantial evidence test was sufficient to overcome article III
concerns in a class 1 context.
100 See Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976);
supra note 80.
101 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85; supra note 79.
102 See Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 544.
103 Cf. S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1473. The Senate rejected the proposal "that specific categories of cases be designated
for trial under proposed subsection 636(c)." Id. It is suggested that the substantial evidence
standard of review limitation upon the magistrate's power is a far more effective method of
preserving the integrity of the article III judicial system than the proposal rejected by the
Senate. Limiting the magistrate's subject-matter jurisdiction would cripple the utility of the
magistrate system, and defeat Congress' intention to reform the trial level of the federal
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CONCLUSION

The Magistrates Act involves two competing federal interests
at work that must be precisely balanced to ensure the constitutionality of the magistrate system. The federal interest in preventing
dilution of the article III system through excessive delegation must
be reconciled with the equally compelling need to maintain access
to federal forums by reducing dockets and providing litigants with
inexpensive and speedy trials. While section 636(c) approaches this
balance, it lacks sufficient protections for periods during which the
second federal interest may appear more compelling than the
first.104 The Pacemaker II court recognized that "[c]ontinued and
vigilant supervision by article III judges is of course essential to
the integrity of the system," but the court did not indicate how it
planned to exercise this supervision.10 5 Adoption of the substantial
evidence standard of review would provide a self-imposed goodfaith effort by the federal judiciary to give both "the appearance
and the reality"1 0 6 of article III vigilance.
Eric M. Wagner

judiciary. See supra note 2.
204 See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 403
(1873), quoted in Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 548 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Justice Story
wrote:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals from the effects of those illhumors which the arts of
designing men or the influence of particular conjunctures sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves; and which, though they speedily give place to better
information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the mean time, to
occasion dangerous innovations in the government ....

Id.
105

Pacemaker II, 725 F.2d at 546.

108 See id. at 544.

